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Abstract:  
Community-based energy organizations have been said to influence their members’ energy-related 
behavior by activating social norms and by providing trustworthy information about sustainable 
energy investments and behaviors. However, little is known yet about members’ actual energy use 
and how it differs from that of individuals who do not participate in such projects. In particular, 
selection effects are likely to arise, i.e. community-based energy projects may attract people that are 
different from the underlying population in terms of energy use. This article empirically addresses 
the question of the selection into community-based energy projects in terms of energy use, focusing 
on the case of renewable energy cooperatives. Based on quantitative data from an original survey 
conducted with one renewable energy cooperative in Flanders and using probit regression analyses, 
it contrasts a sample of cooperative members with an appropriate comparison group in terms of 
electricity usage. The results show that electricity consumption is positively related with cooperative 
membership, suggesting that high use consumers have greater incentives to join a community-
based organization which provides assistance and advice on the adoption of green technologies 
and energy efficiency measures. These findings contribute to an understanding of the relationship 
between community-based governance and sustainable energy practices.  
Keywords: community, renewable energy cooperative, electricity consumption, selection process, 
Flanders. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change associated with the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is among the most 
crucial challenges of the twenty-first century. Averting massive climate change is a global public 
good, because everyone benefits from reduced GHG emissions even if they do not contribute any 
effort themselves, and therefore requires collective action (Sandler, 2004). To tackle this issue, 
many analysts call for an institutional solution at the global level, because global threats such as 
climate change are believed to require ‘global solutions’ negotiated internationally (Nordhaus, 1994; 
Stavins, 1997; Stern, 2007; Wiener, 2007). However, a binding and enforced agreement including 
all principal emitters and targeting an ambitious decrease in global GHG emissions will take long 
to develop (Ostrom, 2010), despite promising commitments at the 21st Conference of the Parties 
held in Paris in Dec. 2015. Most governments' reluctance to engage in coordinated international 
policies bears out the conventional theory of collective action according to which rational agents 
pursuing their own interest will not participate in collective efforts because they have incentives to 
free-ride on the constructive behavior of others (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965).  
More recently, various authors, spearheaded by Nobel Prize co-winner Elinor Ostrom, have 
challenged this ‘zero contribution thesis’ (Ostrom, 2000). They show that, under certain conditions, 
agents involved in a collective-action problem have self-organizational capabilities and are able to 
implement institutional arrangements in order to solve it in the absence of external interventions 
(Ostrom, 1990). In particular, collective-action problems faced by large groups, such as climate 
change mitigation, are often decomposable into dilemmas at a smaller scale, some of which are 
typically surmountable given the existence of social norms and, especially, of pre-existing trust 
networks (e.g. Carattini et al., 2015; Cole, 2015). Given the lack of progress in global climate change 
negotiations, an increasing number of scholars have proposed that a global policy is not the only 
strategy needed but that actions are required at multiple, smaller scales to start the process of 
climate change mitigation (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Ostrom, 2012). 
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Accordingly, several studies have argued that community-based energy (CBE) organizations 
facilitate collective action for climate change mitigation by fostering individual behavioral change 
toward more sustainable energy practices (Heiskanen et al., 2010; Middlemiss, 2011, 2008; Seyfang, 
2010). CBE projects refer to formal or informal citizen-led initiatives which propose collaborative 
solutions, typically on a local basis, to facilitate the development of sustainable energy technologies 
and practices (Bauwens et al., 2016; Walker and Devine-Wright, 2007). In line with the 
contributions of Elinor Ostrom and other institutional scholars, CBE initiatives are said to 
influence their members’ energy-related behavior by activating social norms and by providing 
trustworthy information about sustainable energy investments and behaviors. Fruitful as these lines 
of inquiry are, they have mainly relied on qualitative descriptions of the ways through which CBE 
projects can influence their members’ behaviors. Little is known yet about their actual energy use 
and how it differs from that of individuals who do not participate in such projects. In particular, 
these studies do not deal with the selection effects that are likely to arise, i.e. CBE projects may 
attract people that are different from the underlying population in terms of energy use. 
The present article seeks to contribute to fill this gap and addresses the question of the selection 
into CBE projects by empirically analyzing the electricity consumption of members of renewable 
energy cooperatives and contrasting it with that of an appropriate comparison group. More 
precisely, the research question addressed can be formulated as follows: are members of 
community-based energy projects different from the underlying population in terms of energy use 
and, if so, how? Note that we do not analyze how joining CBE organizations affects energy use, 
due to the observational nature of our data.   
Our paper uses the case of renewable energy (RE) cooperatives, which constitute a specific type of 
CBE initiatives. The quantitative analysis performed is based on an original survey conducted 
among the members of one RE cooperative, Ecopower, located in Flanders, in the northern part 
of Belgium. In addition, this sample of cooperative members is contrasted with a sample of 
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individuals sharing socio-demographic characteristics but not belonging to any RE cooperative. A 
probit regression model is used to examine the effect of electricity usage on the likelihood to join 
a RE cooperative. Following Brounen et al. (2012) and Ohler and Billger (2014), the model controls 
for socio-demographic (gender, education, employment status, age, income), household 
characteristics (homeownership, household size) and dwelling characteristics (type of home, 
primary heating fuel, presence of specific electric appliances, type of electricity meter). In addition, 
it controls for relevant socio-psychological variables (pro-environmental orientation, interpersonal 
trust and feelings of justice). 
The results show that electricity consumption is positively related with cooperative membership, 
suggesting that the cooperative attracts people with a higher electricity use, on average.  The 
magnitude of this effect decreases when controlling for the presence of PV panels, although it 
remains statistically significant. We argue that this can be explained by a selection process: high use 
consumers are more likely to install PV panels, hence approach organizations such as cooperatives, 
which provide active support for installing such technologies and implementing energy efficiency 
measures. 
The following sections of this article present the theoretical considerations motivating this 
investigation (Section 2), the methodology used (Section 3), the empirical analysis (Section 4), the 
discussion of the results and some recommendations (Section 5) for future research. 
2. Related work 
The standard theory of collective action assumes that economic agents are self-regarding, i.e. merely 
caring about their own consumption of public goods (Bowles, 2006). Without coercive measures, 
this would result in a generalized free-riding behavior and a systematic underprovision of public 
goods. In the context of electricity use, this assumption leads to the view that ‘individuals will fail 
to reduce electricity use to the socially efficient level because the costs are paid by the individual 
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but the social benefits of energy reduction accrue to everyone’ (Ohler and Billger 2014: 1).  
Behavioral economics provides an alternative approach as to why and when individuals make 
private provision of public goods. In this vision, individuals also appear to have ‘social’ preferences 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), which can be ‘other-regarding’ or ‘process-regarding’ (Ben-Ner and 
Putterman, 1999). That is to say, rather than strictly about their own, people care about the 
contribution and consumption of others (other-regarding preferences), and about the ways in 
which they or others attain outcomes of interest (process-regarding preferences). These other- and 
process-regarding components explain why individuals accept to follow norms of behavior backed 
up by emotions such as pride, guilt, shame and anger (Bowles and Gintis, 2009). Social norms are 
‘customary rules of behavior that coordinate our interactions with others. Once a particular way of 
doing things becomes established as a rule, it continues in force because we prefer to conform to 
the rule given the expectation that others are going to conform’ (Young, 2008, p. 647). Accordingly, 
not everyone behaves as a selfish free rider. Instead, many people are better described as 
‘conditional cooperators’, i.e. they will contribute to the public good provided they are sure that 
others will act likewise and possibly punish defectors. In this perspective, several attempts have 
been made to formalize the roles of social approval (Rege, 2004) and the maintenance of a 
satisfactory moral image for others and for self (Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg et al., 2006) as 
motivations to adopt cooperative behavior in general and pro-environmental behavior in particular. 
Having said this, the extent to which norms are created and enforced is mediated by the specific 
institutional settings in which social interactions take place. Generally defined, institutions refer to 
‘the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions 
including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private 
associations, and governments at all scales’ (Ostrom, 2005: 3). They constrain the strategies adopted 
by individuals, the information they access, the benefits they receive or are excluded from and how 
they reason about the situation. From an institutional viewpoint, a ‘community’ is characterized by 
high entry and exit costs and personal relationships among members (Bowles and Gintis, 1998, 
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2002). In addition, interactions among community members are more frequent and enduring than 
interactions with non-members. These structural characteristics of interactions differ from those 
of other institutions, such as markets, at least where they approximate the ideal complete-
contracting of standard economic models. Market interactions are typically ephemeral and 
anonymous, and characterized by low entry and exit costs. ‘In contrast to markets, by facilitating 
direct personal interactions, communities effectively encourage the formation of norms, such as 
interpersonal trust, social identification, solidarity, reciprocity, reputation, personal pride, 
vengeance, etc.’ (Bauwens 2016: 280). 
Relying on these structural characteristics of communities, different qualitative studies suggest that 
some communities encourage low-carbon lifestyles by stressing the associated social rewards for 
climate actions (Middlemiss 2008) or by turning the social dilemma they represent into assurance 
games where members can be assured that others will participate (Heiskanen et al. 2010). Moreover, 
CBE initiatives are said to lower information costs related with energy-efficiency technologies and 
conservation behaviors and therefore contribute to overcome some of the informational and 
behavioral barriers to energy efficiency constituting the so-called ‘energy efficiency gap’ 
(Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).2 Indeed, CBE projects may raise their members’ awareness about 
sustainable energy practices through communication channels and information provision. Again, 
norms are likely to play a role in this respect as the trustworthiness of the sources of information 
can positively affect the effectiveness of a message (Laskey and Syler, 2013; Stern et al., 1986). Yet, 
these studies are usually unspecific about the behaviors considered, looking for example at 
‘lifestyles’ or ‘social change’ and do not evaluate to which extent these behaviors are actually 
affected. 
In addition, recent work has explored the characteristics of members of CBE initiatives and the 
factors that influence participation in CBE projects. Bamberg et al. (2015) and Kalkbrenner and 
                                                          
2 The energy efficiency gap describes the existence of unexploited ‘profitable’ investment options in energy saving 
technologies and practices. 
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Roosen (2016) analyze the predictors of the intention to participate in CBE projects in Germany. 
Both studies highlight the important role played by community identity in predicting participation 
intentions. The latter study also emphasizes interpersonal trust and environmental concern as 
additional driving factors to join CBE initiatives. Radtke (2014) examines the characteristics of a 
sample of members of CBE initiatives in Germany and shows that participants are not exclusively 
profit-orientated, tend to be well-educated and to enjoy a good income. Fraune (2015) also analyzes 
a sample of German CBE initiatives from a gender perspective and finds gender differences in 
terms of average ownership rates, amount of investment and leadership positions. Finally, Bauwens 
(2016) focuses on the case of Flanders and shows that members of CBE organizations should not 
be considered as one homogeneous group. Several categories of members with different motives 
and levels of engagement can be distinguished. This heterogeneity is explained by contrasts in terms 
of institutional settings, spatial patterns and attitudes to the diffusion of institutional innovations. 
However, even though these studies may serve as useful starting points, they do not examine the 
characteristics of members of CBE projects in terms of energy use. Given this research gap, the 
empirical analysis in this article assesses whether and how members of CBE organizations behave 
differently in terms of electricity use than individuals who do not belong to any cooperative. The 
methodology followed is presented below. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. The cooperative model in sustainable energy 
Renewable energy (RE) cooperatives are organizations that enable consumers themselves to co-
own and invest in sustainable energy projects, such as RE generation or energy efficiency. From 
an economic standpoint, cooperatives present a different model of ownership from conventional 
business organizations (Hansmann, 1996). Unlike capitalist corporations, they are owned by their 
members/users rather than investors, at least when they supply energy. In addition, net earnings 
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are usually divided pro rata among the members according to the volume of transactions conducted 
with the firm. When part of the net income is allocated as a return on share capital, such profit 
distribution is subject to a cap, which means that maximization of return on capital may not be a 
key objective. Finally, they use a democratic governance structure, which involves equal individual 
voting rights and low barriers to entry for new members. 
The importance of RE cooperatives varies substantially across Europe. While this model is 
widespread in some countries, such as Germany and Denmark, its development remains limited in 
others, e.g. the UK (Bauwens et al. 2016). In Belgium, the cooperative energy sector represents a 
small share of renewable installed capacity. Yet, among the projects, there are pioneers, such as 
Ecopower, which is one of the largest cooperatives in Europe in terms of number of members and 
has been instrumental in the creation of a federation of RE cooperatives at the European level, 
‘REScoop.eu’. 
3.2. Field setting 
The research question of this article is addressed through case study research on one renewable 
energy cooperative based in Flanders (the northern part of Belgium), Ecopower. There are 
currently 6 RE cooperatives in Flanders. However, many of them have been created recently and 
do not have many members yet. In contrast, Ecopower is relatively well-established, as it is the 
oldest initiative. In 2013, Ecopower represented 83% of members of RE cooperatives in Flanders. 
Hence, the case of Ecopower represents a large majority of members of such organizations in this 
region.  
The cooperative studied here develops renewable energy projects (mostly from wind power, but 
also solar, biomass and wood pellets) and supplies electricity to its members. It is controlled by 
individual members who each have equal voting rights and receive a limited return on investments 
in accordance with the cooperative principles. Table 1 presents some of its basic organizational 
characteristics. 
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Table 1. General characteristics of the cooperative Ecopower. 
Year of creation 1991 
Number of full-time equivalent workers 22 
Number of members 47,419 
Price of one cooperative (in euro) 250 
Total cooperative capital (in euro) 48,328,750 
Source: created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperative. 
Ecopower seeks to encourage energy efficiency and conservation behaviors among its members. 
First of all, it uses its different communication channels to provide its members with regular advice 
and information about rational energy use, energy-efficient technologies and green construction. 
This often begins right after people join the organization. For instance, all new members of 
Ecopower receive a telephone call from the staff asking questions about their electricity 
consumption. If this is above the norm, people are questioned about their high consumption and 
given advice. Other communication channels include the organization's quarterly newsletters and 
website. In addition, the cooperative collaborates with the web platform EnergieID in order to 
help members modify its energy use. This website enables energy users to compare their electricity 
consumption with other similar households'. Ecopower promotes this website among its members 
and a more formal partnership was established in 2012 with the creation of an ‘Ecopower’ group 
on the website. Those joining this group are invited to report their electricity consumption monthly. 
The cooperative can then analyze these consumption figures and provide members with a 
personalized report about their consumption and how to reduce it further. 
Interestingly, Ecopower does not charge any fixed fee for electricity connection and only charges 
what is actually consumed. This is a strong incentive to join the cooperative for people who 
generate their own electricity. On the other hand, it actively encourages its members to install PV 
panels on their rooftop. For instance, in 2007, jointly with another RE cooperative, it set up a 
project to install and/or provide technical assistance in installing PV panels on its members’ roof. 
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Members had two options: getting the cooperative to install solar panels for them in exchange of 
a renting fee or installing them with their own capital. In the latter case, the cooperative 
recommended the installation company and the most suitable technological option (in terms of 
price and quality). 
3.3. Data collection 
We collected household data on cooperative members through an online questionnaire-based 
survey conducted between May and June 2014. The design of the questionnaire was based on a 
qualitative exploratory data collected through several non-structured interviews with managers, 
workers and members of the cooperative, with the purpose of understanding better the issues at 
play and discovering important underlying factors that might be missed. The cooperative provided 
members’ email addresses. 36,642 emails were sent to Ecopower members. Furthermore, hard 
copies of the questionnaire were distributed during the organization's General Meeting to the 
purpose of reaching a profile of people who would not have been reached by the online 
questionnaire. Indeed, General Meeting participants are typically an older public with a presumably 
lower usage of the Internet. 195 printed copies of the questionnaire were handed out in Ecopower's 
General Meeting. All in all, out of the 36,837 copies distributed in total, 3988 respondents 
participated in the survey. While this 10.8% response rate averages that obtained in similar surveys 
(Litvine and Wüstenhagen, 2011), drawing firm conclusions about the generality of members calls 
for caution. 
The distributions of the location of members and of the duration of their membership was known 
for the whole population of cooperative members. To enhance the representativeness of the 
collected sample regarding these variables, weighting factors were computed based on these 
variables and applied in the analysis (Table 2). Weighting factors adjust the sample data so that the 
joint sample distribution of members’ location and duration of membership matches their known 
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joint population distribution. Values above 1.00 in Table 2 boost the weight given to the data 
collected from participants in the relevant group, and vice-versa. 
Table 2. Weighting factors used in the data analysis. 
Province Duration of membership (in years) 
 0 ≤ x < 5 5 ≤ x< 10 10 ≤ x< 15 15 ≤ x< 20 20 < x 
Antwerpen 1.053 0.852 0.726 0.015 0.114 
Brussels 1.169 0.945 0.806 0.017 0.126 
Limburg 1.227 0.992 0.846 0.017 0.133 
Oost-Vlaanderen 1.183 0.957 0.815 0.017 0.128 
Vlaams Brabant 1.169 0.945 0.806 0.017 0.126 
West-Vlaanderen 1.068 0.863 0.736 0.015 0.115 
Other 1.375 1.112 0.948 0.020 0.149 
Source: survey (2014). 
In addition, data were collected for energy users who do not belong to a cooperative (N=501) in 
order to compare the results for the two groups. The data collection for this comparison group 
was carried out by a professional survey institute (IPSOS). Quotas were imposed so that the 
comparison group had the same characteristics in terms of gender, geographical location and 
education level as the reference group of cooperative members. Hence, the purpose was not for 
the comparison group to be representative of the general Flemish population, but instead, to differ 
as little as possible from the reference group in characteristics other than membership of a RE 
cooperative. As IPSOS’s respondent panel did not contain people aged above sixty-five, the 
cooperative members above this age were removed from the analysis. Hence, a final total sample 
of 4,068 observations was used. 
3.4. Variables 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if individual i belongs to a 
cooperative and 0 otherwise. Moreover, respondents were asked to indicate their total household 
electricity consumption for the year 2013, in kWh, which includes the electricity bought from their 
electricity supplier and the auto-produced electricity used on site if households have PV panels. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for cooperative membership and electricity consumption. 
13 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of cooperative membership and electricity consumption. 
Source: survey (2014). 
 
In addition, data were also collected to control for basic socio-economic variables (gender, 
education, age, income, employment status), household characteristics (household size, 
homeownership) and dwelling characteristics (apartment or house, type of electricity metering, 
presence of particularly high energy-consuming electric appliances: dryer, dish-washer, toaster, 
electric boiler, kettle, ceramic glass cooktop).  
Finally, data were collected for indicators of socio-psychological characteristics, including 
distributive and procedural feelings of fairness, interpersonal trust and pro-environmental 
orientation. As regards individuals’ procedural and distributive feelings of fairness, judgements 
about justice related to society considered globally3 were accessed by adapting items used in 
organizational psychology (Colquitt, 2001) and in a survey about representations of social justice 
(Jacquemain, 1995). They were answered through 5-point Likert scales, from 1 = ‘completely 
disagree’ to 5 = ‘completely agree’. Interpersonal trust, i.e. the extent to which people trust others 
in general, was measured using three items adapted from the World Value Survey. More specifically, 
respondents had to answer on 7-point scales the following questions: ‘In general, do you think that 
most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with other people?’, ‘Do 
you think most people are helpful, or that most people are selfish?’ and ‘Do you think that most 
people try to take advantage of you, or that most people try to be fair?’. In addition, data were 
collected for respondents’ so-called ‘pro-environmental orientation’, which was captured through 
                                                          
3 Questions related with procedural and distributive justice were purposefully not about cooperative management of 
wind energy projects, given the obvious bias that cooperative members’ answers would contain. Hence, in order to be 
able to contrast the group of cooperative members to the comparison group, it was decided to measure perceptions 
of justice at a more fundamental level. 
Variable Description N Mean SD 
COOPERATIVE = 1 if individual is member of the 
cooperative 4068 0.88 0.33 
CONSUMPTION Electricity consumption in kWh 3681 5235.45 4702.13 
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two dimensions: pro-environmental self-identity and daily behaviors. The degree of pro-
environmental self-identity was measured through six items selected and adapted from existing 
questionnaires (Castro et al., 2009; Fielding et al., 2008; Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010). These items 
measure the extent to which the respondent perceives himself as someone concerned with the 
environment. Respondents’ pro-environmental engagement in terms of daily behaviors was 
measured using pro-environmental behaviors selected from an existing study (Delacolette et al., 
2011), such as ‘reuse old plastic bags’ or ‘buy fruit and vegetables grown locally rather than imported’. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency at which they executed each of the five actions 
over the last fortnight. The items for all socio-psychological characteristics were then aggregated 
into single indices. Table 4 reports the specific statements along with statistics to test for internal 
consistency (item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha4). To facilitate interpretation, indicators 
of socio-psychological characteristic were transformed into binary variables taking the value 1 if 
the respondent’s score is above the median and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4. Item-total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha for the different scales. 
 Item-total 
correlation 
and 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Pro-environmental orientation  
1. I feel concerned about climate change. 0.46 
2. I think that human activities are one of the main causes of climate change. 0.45 
3. I am the type of person who cares about ecology. 0.49 
4. I think of myself as an eco-responsible consumer. 0.40 
5. I want to feel that I personally contribute to the protection of the environment. 0.40 
6. I like that my family or my friends think of me as someone concerned about the 
environment 
0.63 
7. Travel short distances on foot or by bike 0.45 
8. Avoid plastic bags in shops 0.65 
9. Reuse old plastic bags 0.68 
10. Buy fruit and vegetables grown locally rather than imported 0.67 
11. Turn off the tap while brushing my teeth 0.57 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.84 
                                                          
4 Cronbach’s alpha is a statistic that provides a measure of the internal consistency of a test or scale, i.e. the extent to 
which all the items in a test measure the same concept or construct; it is expressed as a number between 0 and 1. A 
low alpha may be due to poor interrelatedness between items. Conversely, if alpha is too high, it may suggest that some 
items are redundant. Values ranging from 0.70 to 0.95 are considered acceptable in most social science research 
situations (DeVellis, 2003; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). 
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Interpersonal trust  
1. Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? 
0.70 
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? 
0.66 
3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly 
looking out for themselves? 
0.64 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.82 
Feelings of distributive justice  
1. In our country, there are too many social inequalities. 0.51 
2. For an economy to work well there must necessarily be rich and poor people. 0.52 
3. Social equality is a good thing, but we have already been too far in Belgium. 0.59 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.73 
Feelings of procedural justice  
1. Policy-makers care about what the population thinks. 0.69 
2. I have the impression that policy-makers take my opinion into account. 0.73 
3. I think that political decisions most of the time are respectful of moral and ethical 
values. 
0.61 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.82 
Source: created by authors. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the description and summary statistics of the household, dwelling, socio-
demographic and socio-psychological variables used in the analysis. 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the dwelling variables. 
Variable Description N Mean SD 
APARTMENT = 1 if household lives in an apartment 4007 0.10 0.29 
HOUSE = 1 if household lives in a house 4007 0.90 0.30 
FUEL = 1 if primary heating system based on fuel 4067 0.18 0.38 
ELECTRICITY = 1 if primary heating system based on electricity 4067 0.02 0.16 
NATURAL = 1 if primary heating system based on natural gas 4067 0.66 0.47 
WOOD = 1 if primary heating system based on wood 4067 0.05 0.22 
PELLETS = 1 if primary heating system based on pellets 4067 0.03 0.17 
HEATPUMP = 1 if primary heating system based on heat pump 4067 0.04 0.20 
HEATOTHER = 1 if primary heating system based on other fuel 4067 0.01 0.11 
DISHWASH = 1 if presence of a dish-washer  in the home 4013 0.78 0.42 
WASHING = 1 if presence of a washing-machine in the home 4059 0.97 0.17 
DRYER = 1 if presence of a dryer in the house in the 
home 3930 0.72 0.45 
TOASTER = 1 if presence of a toaster in the home 3948 0.81 0.39 
KETTLE = 1 if presence of a kettle in the home 3917 0.79 0.41 
CERAMIC = 1 if presence of ceramic glass cooktops in the 
home  3716 0.50 0.50 
BOILER = 1 if presence of an electric boiler in the home 3645 0.31 0.46 
SINGLEMETER = 1 if the home has a single rate meter 4003 0.34 0.47 
TWOMETER = 1 if the home has a two rate meter 4003 0.66 0.47 
Source: survey (2014). 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the household, socio-demographic and socio-psychological 
variables. 
Variable Description N Mean SD 
Household variables    
HOUSESIZE Number of residents in the household 3936 3.00 1.58 
OWNER = 1 if household is owner of the home 4055 0.92 0.27 
TENANT = 1 if household rents the home 4055 0.08 0.27 
Socio-demographic variables    
EDUCATION 
Ordinal variable taking the value 1 if the respondent's 
educational attainment is secondary education, 2 if it 
is superior non-university education and 3 if it is 
university education 
3929 2.08 0.76 
AGE Age in years 4068 46.75 10.15 
GENDER = 1 if individual is a man 4055 0.81 0.39 
INCOME Ordinal variable taking the value 1 if household 
income<2000 €/month, 2 if 2000< household 
income <€ 4000/month and 3 if household income 
>€4000/month 
3475 2.08 0.67 
PVPANELS = 1 if presence of solar panels 3956 0.48 0.50 
PROFESSIONAL = 1 if the respondent is a professional 3902 0.03 0.17 
SELF = 1 if the respondent is self-employed 3902 0.05 0.21 
WORKER = 1 if the respondent is a worker 3902 0.07 0.26 
EMPLOYEE = 1 if the respondent is an employee 3902 0.43 0.50 
EXECUTIVE = 1 if the respondent is an executive 3902 0.18 0.38 
OTHERSTATUS = 1 if the respondent has another employment 
status 3902 0.05 0.22 
INACTIVE = 1 if the respondent is inactive (student, retired, 
etc.) 3902 0.19 0.39 
Socio-psychological variables    
PROENVORIENT = 1 if pro-environmental orientation > median 4068 0.48 0.50 
TRUST = 1 if interpersonal trust > median 4068 0.43 0.50 
DISTRIB = 1 if feelings of distributive justice > median 4068 0.43 0.50 
PROCED = 1 if feelings of procedural justice > median 4068 0.49 0.50 
Source: survey (2014). 
3.5. Econometric approach 
Since the ordinary least squares estimator is not efficient in the case of a binary dependent variable, 
the probability that an individual is a member of the cooperative is modelled by using a probit 
model5, as follows:  
𝐸[𝐶𝑖|𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖, 𝑋𝑖] = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝐶𝑖 = 1|𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) =  Ф(𝛽1𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖)              (1) 
                                                          
5 The empirical results are qualitatively and in most cases quantitatively unchanged if a logit specification is used instead. 
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where i denotes the individual. Ci is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to a 
cooperative and 0 otherwise, Qi is electricity usage for respondent i and Xi is an n length vector of 
control variables. Following other studies of electricity usage (Brounen et al., 2012; Ohler and 
Billger, 2014), we control for socio-demographic, household and dwelling characteristics. 
Additionally, we control for relevant socio-psychological variables. Parameters are estimated by 
maximum likelihood. The cumulative distribution function, Φ, follows a standard normal 
distribution. The marginal effect for the natural logarithm of electricity consumption is computed 
as: 
𝜕𝐸[𝐶𝑖|𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖,𝑋𝑖]
𝜕(𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖)
=  
𝜕𝐸[𝐶𝑖|𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖,𝑋𝑖]
𝜕𝑄𝑖 𝑄𝑖⁄
 = 𝜙(𝛽
1
𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖)𝛽1               (2) 
Where 𝜙 is the standard normal density. The derivative 
𝜕𝐸[𝐶𝑖|𝑙𝑛 𝑄𝑖,𝑋𝑖]
𝜕𝑄𝑖 𝑄𝑖⁄
 is a semi-elasticity and the 
marginal effect can thus be interpreted as the absolute change in the conditional probability Prob 
(Ci = 1|ln Qi, Xi) associated with one percent change in Qi.  
4. Results 
4.1. Mean comparisons 
Table 7 compares the mean scores of electricity consumption, the presence of PV panels and 
selected socio-demographic, socio-psychological and dwelling characteristics between the group of 
cooperative members and the comparison group. 
Table 7. Comparison of cooperative members to the comparison group. 
Variable 
Cooperative 
members 
Comparison 
group 
Test-
Statistic
s 
 Mean (standard error) Mean (standard error)  
CONSUMPTION (in kWh) 5460.05 (88.45) 3811.44 (151.47) 9.40*** 
PVPANELS 0.52 (0.01) 0.19 (0.02) 15.95*** 
PROENVORIENT 0.51 (0.01) 0.28 (0.02) 10.33*** 
TRUST 0.47 (0.01) 0.21 (0.02) 12.26*** 
DISTRIB 0.41 (0.01) 0.61 (0.02) -8.16*** 
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PROCED 0.48 (0.01) 0.50 (0.02) -0.82 
EDUCATION    
< or = High school 0.25 (0.01) 0.25 (0.02) 0.09 
Superior non-university education 0.41 (0.01) 0.42 (0.02) -0.27 
University education 0.34 (0.01) 0.33 (0.02) 0.18 
AGE 46.79 (0.17) 46.54 (0.50) 0.34 
GENDER 0.81 (0.01) 0.81 (0.02) 0.01 
INCOME    
< € 2,000/month 0.18 (0.01) 0.21 (0.02) -1.13 
€2,000< <€4,000/month 0.55 (0.01) 0.54 (0.02) 0.10 
>€4,000/month 0.27 (0.01) 0.25 (0.02) 0.78 
SINGLEMETER 0.70 (0.01) 0.35 (0.02) -13.72*** 
Source: survey (2014). Note: standard errors are in parentheses. Two-samples t-tests were performed to compare the 
means between both groups. P-value: ***p<.01. 
 
As regards electricity consumption, interestingly, cooperative members on average use a 
significantly higher amount of electricity as compared to individuals who do not belong to any RE 
cooperative. There is also a significantly higher proportion of individuals with PV panels in the 
sample of cooperative members (52%) than in the comparison group (19%). This finding confirms 
that the cooperative attracts individuals who have installed PV panels on their rooftop and would 
like to take advantage of the absence of fixed fee for electricity connection (see Section 3.2), and/or 
individuals who would like to install PV panels, knowing that they would enjoy the support of the 
cooperative. 
Regarding socio-demographic characteristics, the sample of cooperative members is predominantly 
male (81%). This contrasts with the general Flemish population, which is about 49% male. This 
gender imbalance is consistent with the results of other studies which show a majority of male 
participants to community-based initiatives in RE production (Fraune, 2015; Radtke, 2014). 
Cooperative members are also more educated than the general population. 75% of cooperative 
members possess a higher education degree while the proportion of the Belgian population with 
higher education was 29% in 2014 (Service Public Fédéral Économie 2014). Furthermore, 27% of 
cooperative members have a monthly net household income above € 4,000. These results indicate 
that the majority of participants are middle-aged, well-educated and mostly well-off. Cooperative 
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members, on average, are also significantly more pro-environmentally oriented, have a significantly 
higher level of interpersonal trust and a significantly lower level of distributive feelings of justice. 
The difference between both groups in terms of feelings of procedural justice is insignificant. 
Interestingly, a significantly higher proportion of cooperative members use a ‘single rate’ meter 
while a higher proportion of individuals in the comparison group use ‘two rate’ meters, which 
makes it possible to track day and night use of electricity separately so that a different kWh rate 
can be offered. This can be explained by the fact that Ecopower offers one single electricity tariff 
which does not change with the time of consumption and is therefore particularly attractive for 
households with a single rate meter. 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
The Correlation Matrix in Table 8 provides some insights into how independent variables are 
related to COOPERATIVE and to each other. The highest (positive) correlation with 
COOPERATIVE is for SINGLEMETER (r = 0.24) and PVPANELS (r = 0.22). LNCONS, i.e. 
the logarithm of electricity consumption, is also positively correlated at 0.17. Homeownership, 
income and education are significantly positively related with cooperative membership. In addition, 
the analysis provides coherent evidence on the predictors of energy use: the presence of large 
electric appliances (dish-washer, washing-machine, dryer, electric boiler) is positively related with 
electricity consumption, as does the number of residents in the house. The presence of PV panels 
has the strongest relationship with LNCONS (r = 0.48), suggesting that people who have PV panels 
tend to consume more electricity, on average. People with heat pumps as primary heating fuels also 
tend to consume significantly more electricity. Moreover, homeownership and the level of income 
correlate positively with electricity usage. In contrast, people living in apartments rather than 
houses and people with a high pro-environmental orientation, on average, have a lower electricity 
use. The latter finding is consistent with the results of several studies which find that environmental 
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concern encourages energy saving behaviors (Brandon and Lewis, 1999; Ek and Söderholm, 2008; 
Lindén et al., 2006; Sardianou, 2007; Wicker and Becken, 2013).
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Table 8. Correlation matrix. 
 
Source: survey (2014). P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
  1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
COOPERATIVE 1                  
LNCONS 2 0.17***                 
HOUSESIZE 3 -0.07*** 0.23***                
APARTMENT 4 -0.14*** -0.27*** -0.24***               
HEATPUMP 6 0.06*** 0.19*** 0.06*** -0.05***              
DISHWASHER 7 0.09*** 0.27*** 0.22*** -0.21*** 0.07***             
WASHING 8 0.05*** 0.16*** 0.15*** -0.23*** 0.02 0.16***            
DRYER 9 -0.04** 0.24*** 0.20*** -0.18*** 0.03** 0.32*** 0.27***           
BOILER 10 -0.11*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.03* 0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 0.04          
SINGLEMETER 11 0.24*** 0.08*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.05*** -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.07***         
OWNER 12 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.13*** -0.40*** 0.04*** 0.24*** 0.18 0.13 -0.06 0.07***        
INCOME 13 0.05*** 0.23*** 0.32*** -0.18*** 0.04** 0.28*** 0.14 0.19 -0.05 -0.02 0.22***       
EDUCATION 14 0.07*** -0.02 0.10*** 0.01 0.02 0.12*** -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.30***      
PROENVORIENT 15 0.17*** -0.09*** -0.03** 0.02 0.01 -0.06*** -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.13***     
TRUST 16 0.17*** -0.01 0.02 -0.05*** 0.01 0.04** 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.19***    
DISTRIB 17 -0.14*** 0.09*** 0.06*** -0.01 0.04** 0.10*** 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.13*** -0.04** -0.23*** -0.08***   
PROCED 18 -0.01 -0.07*** 0.05*** 0.02 -0.01 0.04** 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.09*** 0.14 0.08*** 0.24*** 0.03  
PVPANELS 19 0.22*** 0.48*** 0.15*** -0.27*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.18*** -0.06 -0.08*** 0.01 0.12*** -0.05*** 
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4.3. Regression analysis 
In this section, cooperative members’ actual electricity usage is examined further by simultaneously 
controlling for factors that are likely to be related with electricity consumption. Table 9 reports the 
estimation results obtained with the probit estimation. The reported regression coefficients 
represent the marginal effects of the explanatory variables, which can thus directly be interpreted 
in terms of change in the probability Prob (Ci = 1|ln Qi, Xi). 
Different specifications are estimated and control variables are added gradually. Columns (1) 
focuses on the bivariate relationship between LNCONS and COOPERATIVE, while column (2) 
adds the dwelling variables. Column (3) introduces the basic socio-demographic variables, and 
regression in column (4) includes the socio-psychological variables. Column (5) controls for the 
presence of PV panels. Finally, column (6) is the richest specification, as it also contains dummies 
indicating individuals’ employment status. Column (7) checks for the robustness of the model with 
respect to the presence of outliers. 
The validity of these results depends on the correct specification of the models. In particular, non-
normality and heteroscedasticity of the residuals lead to inconsistent estimates. Hence, the 
hypotheses of normality and homoscedasticity of the distribution of the residuals were tested by 
conducting Lagrange Multiplier tests for homoscedasticity and normality.6 The null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity cannot be rejected at either the 5% or the 10% significance levels in any of the 
cases. Similarly, the null hypotheses of normality of the distribution cannot be rejected at the 5% 
level. These results provide confidence that the likelihood function is correctly specified. In 
addition, Tukey-Pregibon link specification tests were performed after each regression (Hilbe, 
2009). In each case, the link test revealed no problem with our specifications. 
                                                          
6 Both tests are based on the first order conditions from a more general model that specifies the alternative hypothesis, 
and check whether these are violated. 
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Regarding the bivariate regression between LNCONS and COOPERATIVE, the relationship is 
significantly positive, as column (1) shows, with a marginal effect of 0.05. This suggests that people 
with higher energy consumption are more likely to join the cooperative, on average.  
When controlling for the dwelling variables in column (2), the coefficient of LNCONS remains 
significantly positive, but decreases to 0.04. This decrease is driven, in particular, by the inclusion 
of the variables SINGLEMETER and FLAT, each of which correlates relatively strongly and in 
the same direction with LNCONS and the dependent variable (positively for SINGLEMETER 
and negatively for FLAT), as shown in Table 8.  Column (2) also provides some information about 
how dwelling characteristics influence the likelihood of joining the cooperative. Living in an 
apartment rather than in a house has a significantly negative effect, as does the number of residents 
in the household. Having a dish-washer, a washing-machine or an electric boiler in the house 
significantly increases the likelihood of joining the cooperative, while the presence of a dryer and 
the use of electricity as primary heating fuel have a significantly negative effect. The marginal effect 
of SINGLEMETER is relatively large and significantly positive. This confirms that people who 
use a single rate meter instead of a double rate meter are more likely to join the cooperative and 
can be explained by the unique electricity tariff offered by Ecopower. 
The addition of basic socio-demographic characteristics in column (3) does not change the 
previously highlighted findings, but provides some indications about the socio-demographic profile 
of cooperative members: homeownership increases the likelihood of being a cooperative member, 
as does the level of education. The coefficient for the level of income does not appear to be 
significant when controlling for other factors, despite being significantly positively correlated with 
COOPERATIVE in Table 8. 
As shown in column (4), adding socio-psychological variables (pro-environmental orientation, 
interpersonal trust and feelings of distributive and procedural justice) does not change our previous 
results in terms of energy use. Interpersonal trust and pro-environmental orientation are significant 
24 
 
and positively associated with cooperative membership. This indicates that cooperative members 
have a higher propensity to trust others in general and are more pro-environmentally oriented, on 
average, than people who do not belong to any RE cooperative. Feelings of distributive and 
procedural justice are significant and negatively associated with cooperative membership, although 
the effect for feelings of procedural justice is small. An interpretation of these inverse relationships 
between feelings of justice and cooperative membership may be that, by engaging in such projects, 
people with lower feelings of justice seek to take action in favor of a fairer state of the world as far 
as energy is concerned. 
Column (5) controls for the presence of PV panels. The presence of PV panels significantly 
increases the likelihood of being a member of the cooperative by a relatively large amount. People 
who install PV panels are thus more likely to join the cooperative. This confirms that the result 
highlighted in Section 4.1 holds in a multivariate setting. When controlling for this variable, the 
coefficient of LNCONS is still significantly positive, but its magnitude is further reduced to 0.02. 
This is explained by the fact that the presence of PV panels is positively correlated to both 
LNCONS and the dependent variable. Hence, the effect of LNCONS was overestimated due to 
the omission of this variable.  This result suggests that high use households may be more likely to 
install PV panels for economic reasons and, subsequently, approach organizations such as 
cooperatives, which offer active support for the installation of PV systems and attractive electricity 
tariffs for PV users.  
Column (6) controls for employment status. We see that controlling for these variables does not 
modify the findings. 
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Table 8. Likelihood to join the cooperative. 
Source: survey (2014). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Probit Probit Probit Probit  Probit Probit Probit 
LNCONS  0.05*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 
HOUSESIZE  -0.03*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.00) -0.03*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) 
APARTMENT  -0.11*** (0.02) -0.10*** (0.02) -0.08*** (0.02) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.05*** (0.02) -0.03*** (0.01) 
FUEL  -0.05 (0.06) -0.05 (0.06) -0.03 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.03 (0.04) -0.05* (0.03) 
ELECTRICITY  -0.15** (0.07) -0.16** (0.07) -0.11** (0.06) -0.11** (0.06) -0.11** (0.05) -0.11*** (0.03) 
NATURALGAS  0.01 (0.06) -0.02 (0.06) -0.01 (0.05) 0.00 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04) -0.04 (0.03) 
WOOD  0.06 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) 0.07 (0.06) 0.06 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 0.00 (0.03) 
PELLETS  0.01 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) -0.03 (0.03) 
HEATPUMP  0.06 (0.08) 0.05 (0.07) 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) -0.02 (0.03) 
DISHWASHER  0.06*** (0.02) 0.04*** (0.02) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 
WASHING  0.07** (0.03) 0.08** (0.04) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05* (0.03) 0.05* (0.03) 0.04*** (0.01) 
DRYER  -0.07*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 
TOASTER  -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
KETTLE  0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
CERAMIC  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
BOILER  -0.06*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 
SINGLEMETER  0.14*** (0.01) 0.14*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) 
AGE   0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
OWNER   0.09*** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.03*** (0.01) 
GENDER   0.02 (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03* (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 
INCOME   0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01* (0.00) 
EDUCATION   0.03*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
PROENVORIENT    0.07*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 
TRUST    0.08*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 
DISTRIB    -0.08*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) 
PROCED    -0.02* (0.01) -0.01*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) 
PVPANELS     0.11*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 
Dummies for employment status      YES YES 
N 2,549 2,549 2,549 2,549 2,549 2549 2,357 
Log likelihood -1011.27 -852.93 -821.98 -745.24 -709.85 -678.49 -467.68 
Mc-Fadden’s pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.188 0.208 0.282 0.316 0.346 0.490 
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One issue that might arise with survey data is measurement error (Bound et al., 2001), which can 
be the cause of the presence of outliers.7 The maximum likelihood method is very sensitive to the 
presence of outliers and influential observations. This, in turn, can distort parameters estimation. 
Table 9 reports the summary statistics of the deviance residuals, a diagnostic measure used to detect 
potential outliers, and the general rule of thumb used to identify potentially problematic 
observations.  
Table 9. Summary statistics for the deviance residuals. 
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Criterion 
Deviance residuals  
(absolute value) 
2470 0.52 0.53 0.00 3.56 >2 
Source : survey (2014). 
This table suggests that there is at least one observation that is larger than the typical threshold. 
Hence, Column (7) presents the probit regression without the observations for which the deviance 
residual is larger than 2 to see how much impact they have on our regression coefficient estimates. 
The effect of LNCONS is further reduced to 0.01, but is still significantly positive. 
Finally, when considering separately the people who do not have PV panels and those who do 
(Table 10), we can see that the effect of LNCONS is still significantly positive for individuals who 
do not have PV panels. This indicates that people with higher electricity consumption are more 
likely to join the cooperative, on average, even when they do not own PV panels. The effect is also 
positive, although insignificant, when restricting the sample to individuals who have PV panels. 
Table 10. Likelihood to join the cooperative for the sub-samples of individuals with and without 
PV panels. 
 Individuals without PV panels Individuals with PV panels 
 Probit Probit 
LNCONS  0.03*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
HOUSESIZE -0.07*** ((0.01) -0.01*** (0.00) 
APARTMENT -0.12*** (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 
                                                          
7 Outliers are observations with large residual, i.e. their dependent-variable value is unusual given their values on the 
predictor variables. 
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FUEL -0.12 (0.10) 0.03 (0.03) 
ELECTRICITY -0.19* (0.11) -0.03 (0.03) 
NATURALGAS -0.08 (0.09) 0.03 (0.03) 
WOOD 0.04 (0.11) 0.05 (0.03) 
PELLETS -0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.03) 
HEATPUMP -0.11 (0.12) – 
DISHWASHER 0.06** (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 
WASHING 0.07 (0.06) 0.05 (0.03) 
DRYER -0.11*** (0.07) -0.01** (0.01) 
TOASTER 0.03 (-0.11) -0.01 (0.01) 
KETTLE -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.01) 
CERAMIC 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 
BOILER -0.11*** (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) 
SINGLEMETER 0.13*** (0.02) 0.04*** (0.01) 
AGE 0.00 (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 
OWNER 0.10*** (0.03) 0.06 (0.05) 
GENDER 0.01 (0.03) 0.02***  (0.01) 
INCOME -0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 
EDUCATION 0.02 (0.02) -0.01* (0.01) 
PROENVORIENT 0.12*** (0.02) 0.02** (0.01) 
TRUST 0.12*** (0.02) 0.02** (0.01) 
DISTRIB -0.15*** (0.02) -0.03** (0.01) 
PROCED 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 
Dummies for employment status YES YES 
N 1267 1122 
Log likelihood -471.98 -181.74 
Mc-Fadden’s pseudo R-squared 0.32 0.30 
Source: survey (2014). Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. P-value: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Elinor Ostrom and other institutional scholars have shown that the tragedy of the commons is not 
universally valid (Ostrom, 1990). Under certain conditions and, in particular, given the existence of 
trust and other social norms between individuals, people are able to cooperate in order to overcome 
the collective-action problem. This analysis can also be applied to climate change as climate change 
mitigation is a global public good, and relying on existing trust networks at more local scales may 
contribute to fostering collaboration for a more sustainable use of energy. With the view of gaining 
a better understanding of the roles played by these local initiatives, this article addressed the 
question of the selection into community-based sustainable energy organizations in terms of 
members’ energy use, focusing on the case of a renewable energy cooperative. A probit model was 
used to examine the decision to join the cooperative. 
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Our analytical results show that the relationship between participation in the cooperative and 
electricity consumption is significantly positive. This indicates that people with higher electricity 
consumption are more likely to join the cooperative, on average. The magnitude of this relationship 
decreases when controlling for the presence of PV panels, but remains statistically significant. This 
suggests that part of the higher amount of electricity consumed is related to the presence of PV 
panels and can be explained by a selection process. For economic motives, households with a 
higher level of electricity consumption ex ante are more likely to install PV panels on their rooftop 
and, for this very reason, more likely to join an organization which offers electricity tariffs that are 
financially interesting for PV users and provides assistance and advice on installing PV panels (see 
Section 3.2). The effect of electricity consumption is still significantly positive when restricting the 
sample to individuals who do not own PV panels, and positive but insignificant when the sample 
is restricted to those who do. Overall, the results suggest that households having a high electricity 
consumption and/or willing to install solar panels have higher incentives to join a CBE 
organization which provides assistance and advice on the adoption of green technologies and 
energy efficiency measures.  
This study also provides interesting information about the socio-demographic and psychological 
characteristics of members of CBE projects. Cooperative members are more pro-environmentally 
oriented, have a higher level of interpersonal trust and lower feelings of procedural and distributive 
justice than members of the comparison group, on average. As the data presented in this study 
shows, the membership is also relatively culturally and demographically homogeneous and stems 
from the upper-middle socio-economic class. One may argue that the relative homogeneity among 
the membership of community-based organizations makes it more difficult to reap the benefits of 
economic diversity associated with strong complementarities among differing skills and other 
inputs, and deprives people of valued forms of diversity (Bowles 2006). Additionally, this 
homogeneity raises important questions of ‘recognitional’ justice (i.e. justice conceived in terms of 
who is given respect and who is and isn’t valued; see Walker (2012)). On the other hand, 
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homogeneity of preferences and interests facilitates collective action, because people who share 
important social, cultural or economic characteristics may be more willing to cooperate with each 
other (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). Similarly, the literature on cooperatives shows that 
homogeneous interests decrease the costs of collective decision-making (Hansmann, 1999). 
As in any research project, however, the choices made in this study reveal some limitations in our 
findings, which suggests various avenues for future research. First, we did not address the question 
of behavioral change, given the observational nature of the data. One first avenue for further 
research thus would consist in designing an empirical strategy that would make it possible to isolate 
the causal effects of belonging to a community-based energy initiative on energy use. This would 
require collecting experimental or quasi-experimental data by randomizing individuals into a CBE 
project or by mimicking randomization. Another future empirical application could be to assess 
the effect of different economic and behavioral interventions on the energy consumption of CBE 
members, along the lines of the behavioral intervention programs for energy efficiency run in the 
United States by the cooperatively-owned utility Connexus Energy and the energy efficiency 
company Opower (see e.g. Allcott 2011). This would involve making observations before and after 
the implementation of interventions, both in a group of members that receives the intervention 
and in a control group of members that does not, the members being randomly assigned to 
intervention and control groups. The choices made in terms of geographical scope and in our 
sample frame also imply some caution when generalizing our results. Further research could include 
the evaluation of cooperative organizations in other geographical contexts and of other types of 
community-based energy projects. 
These results contribute to the literature on community-based energy and on management for 
environmental sustainability. In addition, gaining a better insight on how members of CBE 
initiatives actually use energy can help practitioners and decision makers design more effective 
supporting policies to foster energy savings at the community level. 
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